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Abstract: Trade agreements and trade measures are policy instruments aimed at favouring trade 
by providing a degree of harmonisation among members. We analyse how the agri-food trade and 
the incidence of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPSs) have evolved for countries sharing 
agreements. We examine, through a regression discontinuity design, whether the approval of 
agreements affects the evolution of trade and SPSs and quantify the trade effects of SPSs. We also 
highlight the differences in trade flows due to the introduction of agreements. Findings show that 
trade agreements tend to increase trade and to reduce the number of policy measures among 
countries. Regulation inequalities exist across trade agreements covering different geo-economic 
areas: after the approval of agreements, the existence and the importance of SPSs become relevant 
among developing countries, whereas the pervasiveness of SPSs becomes less stringed between 
developed and developing countries. Our analyses prove that trade agreements and trade 
measures are trade-enhancing, with the cereals sector benefitting the most.  
Keywords: Agri-food trade; Non-tariff measure; Regional trade agreement; Policy. 
 
1. Introduction 
Deep changes have characterised the global agri-food sector over the last decades: an outcome 
of the economic globalisation that has stimulated the development of global commodity chains and 
has created a deep economic integration [1, 2]. By facing such continuous changes, policymakers 
have attempted to progressively liberalise the agri-food trade: multilateral and country-specific 
negotiations have been longstanding at the forefront of the trade policy agenda [3]. In particular, the 
multilateral negotiations of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in the mid-1990s have provided a 
substantial reduction of tariffs, balanced out by the wide diffusion of non-tariff measures (NTMs) 
[4]. In parallel with the multilateral negotiations, several agreements have evolved at regional level 
to further liberalise trade: the higher the initial level of trade regulations between members, the 
larger the trade liberalisation. In particular, the latter may occur through a process of convergence 
from above (e.g. by lowering regulations) or from below (e.g. by raising harmonised regulations) [5]. 
Trade regulations and their harmonisation between members are, thus, relevant issues in the 
negotiation agenda of trade agreements, due to their controversial impacts on trade [6]. In fact, while 
a number of studies conclude that NTMs are trade-impeding [e.g. 7, 8], others demonstrate that they 
are trade-enhancing [e.g. 9]. In addition, several studies support both the barriers and the catalysts 
role of NTMs on trade [e.g. 10-12]. The heterogeneous effects of policy measures on trade are 
frequently related to the different types of NTMs and their rationales, but might also be a 
consequence of the specific products and countries under investigation [13]. 
Most of the existing literature focuses on the trade effects of NTMs, distinguishing between 
country-specific and internationally harmonised measures [e.g. 14, 15], or on the effects of trade 
agreements, in particular on trade creation and diversion [e.g. 3, 16, 17]. Vice-versa, in the academic 
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 debate, little attention has been given to the role of NTMs as trade barriers or catalysts in the context 
of trade agreements. An exception is the study by Disdier et al. [6] that examines whether, in the 
framework of economic integration agreements among developed and developing countries, the 
harmonisation of technical measures affects international trade. Their analysis suggests that trade 
agreements create trade between developed and developing members, but also divert trade between 
developing members and developing non-members. They also argue that the harmonisation of trade 
measures on the basis of regional standards negatively impacts trade from developing to developed 
countries. However, these evidence call for further research: are differences, in terms of trade 
impact, observable in a context wider than the developed-developing agreements, or at the sector 
level? We aim at filling this gap by investigating if and how the approval of trade agreements affects 
the evolution of trade and NTMs over time. We also examine the trade effects of policy measures 
before and after the introduction of the agreements. 
Our focus is on the most adopted NTMs in the agri-food sector: Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Standards (SPSs). We use a large dataset on country-specific trade flows and SPSs which includes 
data, from 1990 to 2015, on the major developed and developing countries sharing trade agreements. 
The empirical analysis is built on a regression discontinuity design [18,19], that allows us to 
conclude on specific trade impacts of SPSs before and after the entry into force of trade agreements. 
Moreover, sector-specific analyses highlight differences among the most regulated agri-food 
products. 
1.1 On Trade Agreements and technical Non-Tariff Measures in the agri-food sector 
The general increase and the changing patterns of trade intensity have characterised the 
agri-food sector over the last decades [13]. Such phenomena may be the consequence of the 
progressive process of trade liberalisation and of the impact of specific provisions to fulfil trade 
agreements. In fact, the agenda of trade negotiations has shifted from tariffs (reduced to an average 
lower than 5%) to a wide range of behind-the-border trade measures [6]. The majority of countries 
have sought to improve their market access though preferential, bilateral, and regional trade 
agreements: while multilateral negotiations have stalled, a number of collective agreements has 
entered into force (figure 1). Since 2000, the number of new agreements notified to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) experienced a considerable growth: in 2017, the trade agreements has been 314 
(compared to 96 in 2000), of which 90% regional (RTAs) and 10% preferential (PTAs) [20, 21]. 
 
Figure 1. Global trade agreements by year of entry into force, 1990-2017. Source: elaboration on [20, 21]. 
Notes: Acronyms are Preferential Trade Ageements (PTAs) and Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs). 
 Trade agreements may facilitate market access by lowering tariffs cuts and providing other 
market access concessions [22]. In particular, trade agreements have a dual effect on trade response: 
they push toward the creation of intra-bloc trade, and lead to trade diversion toward developing 
countries [23, 24, 6]. Mutually beneficial trade liberalisation is more likely to be achieved within 
country-specific agreements rather than in an heterogeneous multilateral framework. In fact, 
country-specific agreements are more versatile and allow to easily address trade negotiations that 
cover the increasing range of non-tariff measures (NTMs) [6]. 
The NTMs, defined as “policy measures other than ordinary customs tariffs that can potentially 
have an economic effect on international trade in goods, changing quantities traded, or prices or 
both” [25] (p. 1), may be technical or non technical. In particular, technical NTMs may be raised to 
protect human, animal, and plant health from risks arising from contaminants or disease-causing 
organisms (Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards, SPSs), or to lay down characteristics that 
products, related processes, and production methods should ensure (Technical Barriers to Trade, 
TBTs). 
The intensity of technical regulations implemented per year in the agri-food sector has 
substantially grown in a century (from 325 in 1910 to 664,738 in 2016, [26], showing heterogeneous 
patterns across periods, countries, product categories, and types of measures. In particular, the 
number of technical NTMs, negligible until the mid-1990s, experienced an exponential increase after 
1994 (+360%, from 120,272 implemented until 1994 to 554,446 until 2016, [26]). In fact, the 
negotiations of the WTO determined the proliferation of the NTMs in response to a large reduction 
in tariffs [4, 13]. 
Despite only few countries are responsible of the wide diffusion of technical NTMs, the number 
of implementing countries has increased by 30% from pre- (1910-1994) to post-Uruguay Round era 
(1995-2016). Approximately 70% of technical NTMs have been implemented by 20% of countries 
before 1994 and by 40% of countries after 1994 (lower concavity of the cumulative density function 
1995-2016, figure 2) [26]. In particular, in recent times there has been an increase of regulations in 
developing countries, which tend to affirm their role in the WTO consultations [27, 28].  
While countries implementing technical NTMs and types of measures have changed over time, 
there has been no substantial variations in the incidence of technical NTMs on specific agri-food 
sectors. In fact, seafood and meat-based products, fruit and vegetables, dairy produce, preparations 
of meat and fish, oilseeds and cereals are the longstanding most affected sectors [26]. 
In addition, of technical NTMs the most widespread are the SPSs, whose number has largely 
exceeded the TBTs one over years. As for types of SPSs, the most implemented have been (in 
descending order) certification and inspection requirements (SPSs A830 and A840), special 
authorisation requirement for SPS reasons (SPS A140), restricted use of certain substances in foods 
and feeds and their contact materials (SPS A220) and labelling requirements (SPS A310): while the 
incidence of SPSs A830, A840, A140, A220 reduces by 50% after the Uruguay Round, the opposite is 
true for SPS A310 [26]. 
The WTO members may arbitrarily rise or lower SPSs, provided that the SPSs comply with 
basic principles of the WTO’s SPS Agreement, that establish conditions under which national 
regulatory authorities may set safety standards directly or indirectly influencing international trade 
[29]. Accordingly, the SPSs have to be based on objective scientific data (justification of measures); 
need to be consistent with international standards defined by the Office International des Épizooties 
(OIE) for animal health, the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) for plant health, and 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission for food safety (harmonisation of standards); may be country- or 
region-specific due to differences in sources and levels of risk (regionalisation); have to be accepted as 
alternative measures by trading partners if ensure the same level of accepted risk (equivalency); 
should be based on appropriate risk assessment procedures if standards exceed the international 
ones (risk assessment); have to be notified and/or explained to trading partners if modified or of new 
introduction (transparency); may be provisional (temporary measures) and/or subject to dispute 
settlement. 
 
  
Figure 2. Cumulative Density Functions (CDFs) of technical Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs) by 
implementing countries: detail by different time periods. Source: elaboration on [26]. Note: The 
theoretical CDF is expressed as a dashed line. 
The compliance with principles of the SPS Agreement allow to progressively standardise the 
trade effects of SPSs that, as suggested in [30], reflect divergences among countries’ food safety 
regulations, differences in consumers’ preferences across countries, ability (or limited capacity) to 
produce safe food, and willingness to pay for risk-reducing technology. 
2. Materials and methods 
2.1. Description of data 
Our analysis relies on bilateral, annual data for 19 countries from 1990 to 2015. According to the 
United Nations’ country classification [31], we select developed economies (Australia, Canada, the 
European Union, New Zealand, and the United States) and developing economies (BRIICS countries 
such as Brazil, Russian Federation2, China, Indonesia, India, South Africa; Latin American countries 
such as Argentina, Bolivia, Peru; Northern and Central African countries such as Congo, Egypt, 
Libya, Morocco, Tunisia) so to account for 77% of the global gross domestic product (GDP). In 2015, 
developed economies, BRIICS countries, Egypt, and Peru are listed as top 25% economies for level of 
GDP. All these economies have benefited from a general growth in global welfare from 1990 to 2015: 
in particular, Bolivia and Congo have more than quadrupled their GDPs, while Libya, Morocco, and 
Tunisia have tripled their GDPs [32].. Since 2000, the importance of developing economies and of 
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 BRIICS countries has driven the development of global agri-food markets. In particular, most of the 
increased share of BRIICS’ agri-food trade represents increased trade with other BRIICS countries. 
Bilateral trade data are collected from the UN Comtrade database; data on country-specific 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPSs) are provided by the UNCTAD’s Global Database on 
Non-Tariff Measures; the Regional Trade Agreements Information System (RTA-IS) and the WTO 
Database on Preferential Trade Arrangements (PTAs) makes available information on RTAs and 
PTAs (e.g. year of entry into force, signatory countries, involved regions). 
We focus on the 8 most regulated categories in the agri-food sector, coded according to the 
Harmonised System (HS) 2-Digit Chapter Headings: in descending order, fish (03, 27%), meat (02, 
14%), vegetables (07, 9%), dairy produce (04, 8%), preparation of meat and fish (16, 8%), fruits (08, 
7%), oil seeds (12, 5%), cereals (10, 3%) [26]. We work at the two-digit level in order to avoid 
potential endogeneity bias implied by measures implemented for protectionist purposes or to 
control imports in the absence of sizeable tariffs [33]. 
2.2. Inventory approach 
We analyse the incidence of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPSs) within Regional 
Trade Agreements (RTAs) through an inventory approach [34]. We compute the frequency index, 
the coverage ratio, and the prevalence score at country-pair level (ij), two years before and two years 
after the entry into force of the agreement (t±2) to better capture the effect of the agreements. 
The frequency index is an indicator of the presence/absence of trade measures; it captures the 
percentage of products subject to one or more SPSs: 
 𝐹௜௝,௧±ଶ = ቈ
∑ 𝐷௜௝,௧±ଶௌ௉ௌ 𝐷௜௝,௧±ଶ௑௜௝
∑ 𝐷௜௝,௧±ଶ௑௜௝
቉ ∙ 100 (1) 
where 𝐷௜௝,௧±ଶௌ௉ௌ  and 𝐷௜௝,௧±ଶ௑  are dummy variables that equals 1 respectively if at least one SPS and 
trade flows (X) exist between i and j at time t-2 and t+2 (0 otherwise). 
The coverage ratio reflects the importance of SPSs on overall trade; it captures the percentage of 
trade subject to one or more measures: 
 𝐶௜௝,௧±ଶ = ቈ
∑ 𝐷௜௝,௧±ଶௌ௉ௌ 𝑋௜௝,௧±ଶ௜௝
∑ 𝑋௜௝,௧±ଶ௜௝
቉ ∙ 100 (2) 
where 𝑋௜௝,௧±ଶ is the value of trade between i and j at time t-2 and t+2. 
The prevalence score accounts for the pervasiveness of trade measures; it captures the average 
number of SPSs implemented on a product. 
 𝑃௜௝,௧±ଶ =
∑ 𝑆𝑃𝑆పఫ,௧±ଶതതതതതതതതതതത𝐷௜௝,௧±ଶ௑௜௝
∑ 𝐷௜௝,௧±ଶ௑௜௝
 (3) 
where 𝑆𝑃𝑆పఫ,௧±ଶതതതതതതതതതതത is the average number of SPSs applied between i and j at time t-2 and t+2: the larger 
the number of trade measures applied in each country-pair, the more stringent the regulation in that 
agreement. 
We analytically examine the three indicators through descriptive statistics and graphical 
analyses. In particular, we compare the distributions of the frequency index, the coverage ratio, and 
the prevalence score before (at t-2) and after (at t+2) the year of entry into force of RTAs, highlighting 
differences and similarities among several agreements. 
2.3. Empirical approach 
We investigate if and how the approval of a Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) affects the 
evolution of trade and of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPSs) over time by adopting a 
regression discontinuity design [18, 19]. We assume that the logarithm of trade flows (ln൫𝑋௜௝௞൯) and 
the number of implemented SPSs (𝑆𝑃𝑆௜௝௞ ) are function of the overall time trend (t) and of the time 
trend after the introduction of a RTA (t post-RTA): 
  ln൫𝑋௜௝௞൯ = 𝛿 + 𝜃଴𝑡 +෍𝜃ଵ௞
௄
௞ୀଵ
𝑡௣௢௦௧ିோ்஺𝐷௜௝௞ + 𝑢௜௝௞  (4) 
and 
 𝑆𝑃𝑆௜௝௞ = 𝛿 + 𝜃଴𝑡 +෍𝜃ଵ௞
௄
௞ୀଵ
𝑡௣௢௦௧ିோ்஺𝐷௜௝௞ + 𝑢௜௝௞  (5) 
where the superscript k indexed agri-food products and the subscripts ij index country-pairs; 𝛿 is a 
constant, 𝜃଴ and 𝜃ଵ௞ are the parameters of interest, 𝑢௜௝௞  is the error term. In the sensitivity analyses, 
the product-specific dummy variable (𝐷௜௝௞ ) allows us to capture the evolution of trade and SPSs in 
each agri-food sector. 
As a further step, we examine the trade effects of the SPSs before and after the introduction of 
RTAs: 
 ln൫𝑋௜௝௞ ൯ = 𝛼 +෍𝛽௧
்
௧ୀଵ
+ 𝛾଴𝑆𝑃𝑆௜௝௞ +෍𝛾ଵ௞
௄
௞ୀଵ
𝑆𝑃𝑆௜௝,௣௢௦௧ିோ்஺௞ 𝐷௜௝௞ + 𝜀௜௝௞  (6) 
where 𝛽௧ are time fixed effects; 𝛼 is a constant, 𝛾଴ and 𝛾ଵ௞ are the parameters of interest, 𝜀௜௝௞  is the 
error term; ij, k, ln൫𝑋௜௝௞൯, 𝑆𝑃𝑆௜௝௞ , 𝐷௜௝௞  are defined as above. 
We estimate the equations (4)-(6) through least squares and disentangle, from the overall effect 
(model A), the effect produced by the approval of RTAs (model B), and the product-specific effect 
(model C). 
3. Results 
3.2. Results of the inventory analyses 
A vast majority of countries have at least one Regional Trade Agreement (RTA): in particular, 
we found that 13 out of 19 countries are involved in RTAs (table 1). RTAs tend to be in place among 
countries with similar levels of economic development. In particular, the United States (US) and 
Canada, and Australia and New Zealand have stipulated a RTA (since the mid-1980s). RTAs are also 
established among Latin American countries, while China has trade agreements with Indonesia 
(since 2009) and Peru (since 2010). Russian Federation and African countries have no RTAs in force: 
the only exception is Morocco that implemented one RTA with the US since 2006. In addition, there 
are several RTAs stipulated among countries with different levels of economic development: among 
Peru and the US (since 2009); Peru and Canada (since 2010); Peru and the European Union (EU) 
(since 2013); Indonesia and Australia; Indonesia and New Zealand (since 2010). 
From 1990 to 2015, the average value of trade has been greater among countries belonging to 
RTAs than among countries that have no RTAs in place (266 million US$ compared to 79 million 
US$) [35]. Conversely, the average number of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPSs) has been 
lower among countries within RTAs (1.52 compared to 1.77) [26]. In line with Scoppola et al. [17], we 
find asymmetries between countries within and out of trade agreements. 
As for countries sharing a RTA, table 2 shows the evolution of trade and level of regulations, as 
well as of the frequency index, the coverage ratio, and the prevalence score two years before and two 
years after the introduction of RTAs (according to the date of entry into force of the agreements). 
Trade values tend to be greater after the entry into force of RTAs in 13 out of 15 agreements. 
Few exceptions are the US and Australia, and Peru and the US, whose trade flows decrease by 87% 
and 23% respectively. Vice-versa, trade relationships are particularly favoured by RTAs for China 
and New Zealand or Indonesia (trade exponentially increased when RTAs are in place), and for 
Indonesia and Australia or India (trade nonexistent before the RTAs). In fact, as suggested by Grant 
and Lambert [36] (p. 766), a “successful liberalisation of agricultural trade within RTAs could generate a 
relatively larger trade response”. 
 Table 1. Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) into force between pairs of countries, 1990-2015. 
 Reporter 
Partner Argentina Bolivia Brazil Canada China Indonesia New Zealand Peru United States 
Argentina  since 1996 since 1992 no no no no no no 
Australia no no no no no since 2010 since 1983 no since 2005 
Bolivia since 1996  since 1996 no no no no since 1995 no 
Brazil since 1992 since 1996  no no no no no no 
Canada no no no  no no no since 2010 since 1989 
China no no no no  since 2010 since 2009 since 2010 no 
Congo no no no no no no no no no 
Egypt no no no no no no no no no 
European Union no no no no no no no since 2013 no 
Indonesia no no no no since 2010  since 2010 no no 
India no no no no no since 2010 no no no 
Libya no no no no no no no no no 
Morocco no no no no no no no no since 2006 
New Zealand no no no no since 2009 since 2010  no no 
Peru no since 1995 no since 2010 since 2010 no no  since 2009 
Russian Federation no no no no no no no no no 
Tunisia no no no no no no no no no 
United States no no no since 1989 no no no since 2009  
South Africa no no no no no no no no no 
Source: elaboration on [20]. 
  
 Country-specific differences emerge in the level of SPSs. Nonexistent in the period pre-RTA, the 
SPSs started to regulate trade between developing countries after the approval of a RTA (i.e. 
between Latin American countries, and between Indonesia and China or India); in particular, the 
SPSs are implemented some year after the entry into force of the RTA between Bolivia and Brazil 
(since 2000), and between Argentina and Bolivia, and Bolivia and Peru (since 2003). The phase-in 
period of RTAs may have different length: in some cases, the harmonisation of trade policies 
between members may take several years [36]. The SPSs tend to be lower for countries with different 
levels of economic development sharing RTAs (exception made for Canada and Peru). 
The frequency indices, the coverage ratios, and the prevalence scores reflect the evolution of 
trade and SPSs. We observe that countries sharing a RTA apply some form of SPSs for 94% of 
products (average frequency index), accounting for 98% of traded values (average coverage ratio), 
both before and after the entry into force of the agreements. A relatively higher coverage ratio may 
be due to larger traded volumes of products under regulation (especially from developing countries) 
and to a wider implementation of trade measures on the most traded products (in particular from 
developed countries) [34]. 
However, the incidence of the SPSs is heterogeneous across agreements and time periods 
(figure 3). In periods previous the approval of RTAs, only trade between developed and developing 
countries is regulated by SPSs (exception made for China and Peru). After the entry into force of 
RTAs, the pervasiveness of SPSs per product is a new and relevant phenomenon between 
developing countries (prevalence scores from 0 before the RTA to at least 1 after the RTA), but 
becomes less stringed between countries with different levels of economic development (i.e. lower 
values of prevalence scores in most of developed-developing country-pairs). As suggested in 
Scoppola et al. [17], the reduction of non-tariff measures offsets potential negative impacts due 
increased variable and fixed costs that countries face to access to trade agreements. 
Overall, the inventory analyses shed light on regulation inequalities across different 
geo-economic areas and time periods. A plausible explanation is that “the high quality and safety food 
standards of developed countries and the related process of harmonisation on a regional, and not multilateral, 
basis, represents a complex behind-the-border barrier for developing countries” [17] (p. 261). The important 
use of the SPSs among countries with different levels of economic development may result from an 
effort of developing countries to harmonise regulations with their main developed trading partners. 
 
  
 Table 2. The evolution of trade values, number of SPSs, frequency indices, coverage ratios, and prevalence scores before and after the entry into force of RTAs. 
Pairs of countries 
sharing RTAs 
Year of 
entry into 
force (t) 
Trade (million US$) Number of SPSs Frequency index (%) Coverage ratio (%) Prevalence score 
Pre-RT
A 
(t-2) 
Post-RT
A 
(t+2) 
Δ 
Pre-RT
A 
(t-2) 
Post-RT
A 
(t+2) 
Δ 
Pre-RT
A 
(t-2) 
Post-RT
A 
(t+2) 
Δ 
Pre-RT
A 
(t-2) 
Post-RT
A 
(t+2) 
Δ 
Pre-RT
A 
(t-2) 
Post-RT
A 
(t+2) 
Δ 
Argentina-Bolivia 1996 33 75 ↗ 0 0 ─ 0.0 0.0 ─ 0.0 0.0 ─ 0.0 0.0 ─ 
Argentina-Brazil 1992 496 2,190 ↗ 0 4 ↗ 0.0 11.8 ↗ 0.0 0.9 ↗ 0.0 1.0 ↗ 
Bolivia-Brazil 1996 17 40 ↗ 0 0 ─ 0.0 0.0 ─ 0.0 0.0 ─ 0.0 0.0 ─ 
Bolivia-Peru 1995 4 49 ↗ 0 0 ─ 0.0 0.0 ─ 0.0 0.0 ─ 0.0 0.0 ─ 
Canada-Peru 2010 524 755 ↗ 69 136 ↗ 52.1 90.1 ↗ 29.3 52.9 ↗ 1.0 1.1 ─ 
China-Indonesia 2010 587 117,000 ↑ 0 1,851 ↑ 0.0 99.5 ↑ 0.0 99.6 ↑ 0.0 1.1 ↑ 
China-New Zealand 2009 1,570 202,000 ↑ 128 249 ↗ 87.9 94.7 ↗ 90.3 99.8 ↗ 1.3 1.1 ↘ 
China-Peru 2010 246 518 ↗ 39 96 ↗ 67.2 79.6 ↗ 3.6 20.5 ↑ 1.0 1.0 ─ 
Indonesia-Australia 2010 0 136,000 ↑ 0 1,851 ↑ 0.0 99.9 ↑ 0.0 100.0 ↑ 0.0 1.1 ↗ 
Indonesia-India 2010 0 43,700 ↑ 0 1,850 ↑ 0.0 99.9 ↑ 0.0 99.5 ↑ 0.0 1.1 ↗ 
Indonesia-New Zealand 2009 1,710 45,900 ↗ 96 2,067 ↑ 97.2 100.0 ↗ 100.0 100.0 ─ 1.4 1.1 ↘ 
Peru-European Union 2013 2,690 4,950 ↗ 847 1,380 ↗ 96.9 97.6 ↗ 87.0 92.5 ↗ 1.1 1.1 ─ 
Peru-United States 2009 17,300 13,400 ↘ 1,433 1,808 ↗ 99.7 99.3 ↘ 99.5 95.3 ↘ 1.9 1.8 ↘ 
United States-Australia 2005 390,000 48,800 ↘ 1,731 1,741 ↗ 99.7 99.8 ↗ 100.0 99.8 ↘ 2.2 2.2 ─ 
United States-Morocco 2006 3,860 14,800 ↗ 1,222 1,293 ↗ 99.5 99.7 ↗ 100.0 100.0 ─ 2.3 2.1 ↘ 
Source: elaboration on [26, 20, 35]. Notes: There are no trade flows between Indonesia and Australia, and Indonesia and India since 2002 until 2007, and no SPSs since 1990 until 
2007. The SPSs are implemented since 2000 between Bolivia and Brazil, and since 2003 between Argentina and Bolivia, and Bolivia and Peru. 
 
Figure 3. Frequency index, coverage ratio, and prevalence score by country-pairs 2 years before/after the entry into force of RTAs. Source: elaboration on [26, 35]. 
 3.2. Empirical results 
The results of the regression discontinuity design show the evolution of trade values and 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPSs) (table 3), and the trade effects of the SPSs (table 4), 
comparing the general trend (model A) with the effect after the stipulation of RTAs (model B). The 
results of the sensitivity analyses highlight differences across the agri-food sectors (model C). 
The coefficients estimated for the variables ‘Time’ and ‘Time post-RTA’ are positive if ‘Trade’ is the 
dependent variable and negative if ‘SPS’ is the dependent variable, and are consistent across models 
A, B, and C (table 3). The results are in line with findings from the inventory analyses and highlight 
that trade values increase whereas the SPSs decrease with time. In particular, these effects are more 
evident after the entry into force of RTAs: trade increases by 15.2% and the SPSs decrease by 0.1% as 
fast after the approval of the agreements3 (table 3, B). As demonstrated by Sun and Reed [3], trade 
agreements are able to generate trade increase and led to multilateral lowering of trade barriers (e.g. 
non-tariff measures) for the agri-food products among members of the agreements. 
Table 3. The evolution of trade values and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPSs): (A) overall 
effects, (B) effects post-Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs), and (C) product-specific effects. 
Variables A B C Trade SPS Trade SPS Trade SPS 
Time 7.300 *** -54.446 *** 1.460 ** -52.700 *** 1.834 *** -52.700 *** (0.591)  (0.518)  (0.614)  (0.537)  (0.613)  (0.537)  
Time post-RTA 
    0.222 *** -0.071 *** 0.545 *** -0.226 *** 
    (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.027)  (0.024)  
Time post-RTA 
(meat) 
        -0.207 *** 0.173 *** 
        (0.030)  (0.027)  
Time post-RTA (fish) 
        -0.415 *** 0.077 *** 
        (0.028)  (0.026)  
Time post-RTA 
(dairy) 
        -0.310 *** 0.083 *** 
        (0.031)  (0.028)  
Time post-RTA 
(vegetables) 
        -0.580 *** 0.360 *** 
        (0.032)  (0.029)  
Time post-RTA 
(fruit) 
        0.240 *** 0.199 *** 
        (0.031)  (0.028)  
Time post-RTA 
(oilseeds) 
        -0.031  0.262 *** 
        (0.036)  (0.033)  
Time post-RTA 
(preparations of 
meat and fish) 
        -1.184 *** 0.217 *** 
        (0.033)  (0.030)  
Constant 0.701 
 111.037 *** 12.360 *** 107.600 *** 11.618 *** 107.500 *** 
(1.187)  (1.040)  (1.233)  (1.078)  (1.229)  (1.078)  
Observations 528,834  549,810  528,834  549,810  528,834  549,810  
R-squared 0.000  0.020  0.003  0.020  0.009  0.021  
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** and ** indicate statistical significance at 1% and 5%. Notes: The 
estimated coefficients (exclusion made for the constant) are of the order of 10-3. In the model C, the coefficient 
estimated for ‘Time post-RTA’ gives back the effect after the introduction of RTAs on cereals. 
In the sensitivity analyses, the coefficients estimated for product-specific ‘Time post-RTA’ are 
negative and statistically significant in 5 out of 8 cases with ‘Trade’ as dependent variable (i.e. meat, 
fish, dairy, vegetables, preparations of meat and fish), and positive and statistically significant in 7 
out of 8 cases with ‘SPS’ as dependent variable (i.e. meat, fish, dairy, vegetables, fruit, oilseed, 
preparations of meat and fish). In both models (‘Trade’ and ‘SPS’), the coefficients estimated for the 
baseline (‘Time post-RTA’) give back the effect on cereals after the entry into force of RTAs. 
                                                 
3 We derived the ‘speed’ of increase or decrease of trade or SPSs as the ratio between the coefficient of interest 
post-RTA (e.g. ‘Time post-RTA’)and the coefficient for the entire period (i.e. ‘Time’). 
 The results highlight that the higher trade increase after the approval of RTAs depends on the 
more rapid increase in trade of cereals (+29.7%) and fruit (+13.1%). Vice-versa, trade of seafood and 
meat-based products (both raw and processed), vegetables, and dairy produce suffers a setback 
during the period post-RTAs. As for trade measures, only the SPSs that regulate trade of cereals 
decrease after the approval of RTAs (table 3, C). The product-specific effects of the RTAs may be due 
to the fact that the agreements frequently cover a limited set of products (i.e. partial scope 
agreements): in the agri-food sector this issue is the rule rather than the exception [16]. 
Considering the trade effects of policy measures within trade agreements, table 4 shows that the 
SPSs are trade catalysts, in particular after the stipulation of RTAs (model B). However, the trade 
effects are product-specific: while the SPSs are trade-promoting for cereals4, they tend to friction 
trade of other agri-food products (model C). As suggested in Santeramo and Lamonaca [13], it is 
plausible that the trade effects of policy measures depend on the dynamics of specific agri-food 
sectors. In addition, previous literature highlights that trade of cereals is likely to increase between 
members of the agreements, but not to be diverted towards counties out of the agreements [2]. A 
number of studies also demonstrate that the SPSs (and NTMs in general) are trade-impeding for 
oilseeds and dairy produce [37], fruits and vegetables [7, 38, 39], meat-based products [12], and 
seafood products [40]. Not surprisingly, a common feature of the above mentioned products is the 
elevate perishability, which influences price and trade dynamics [41, 42].  
Table 4. The trade effects of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPSs): (A) overall effects, (B) 
effects post-Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs), and (C) product-specific effects. 
Variables A B C 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
SPSs 0.040 *** 0.034 *** 0.038 *** (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  
SPSs post-RTA 
  0.110 *** 1.103 *** 
  (0.005)  (0.050)  
SPSs post-RTA (meat) 
    -0.656 *** 
    (0.052)  
SPSs post-RTA (fish) 
    -0.831 *** 
    (0.052)  
SPSs post-RTA (dairy) 
    -0.694 *** 
    (0.054)  
SPSs post-RTA (vegetables) 
    -1.133 *** 
    (0.050)  
SPSs post-RTA (fruit) 
    -0.870 *** 
    (0.051)  
SPSs post-RTA (oilseeds) 
    -0.833 *** 
    (0.053)  
SPSs post-RTA (preparations of meat and fish) 
    -1.537 *** 
    (0.054)  
Constant 14.850 *** 14.870 *** 14.860 *** (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.032)  
Observations 499,153  499,153  499,153  
R-squared 0.013  0.014  0.019  
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates statistical significance at 1%. Notes: In the model C, the 
coefficient estimated for ‘Time post-RTA’ gives back the effect after the introduction of RTAs on cereals. 
All in all, the empirical results demonstrate that trade and the SPSs evolve in opposite 
directions over time: trade agreements tend to favour the increase of trade and the reduction of 
policy measures between members. In addition, both the SPSs and RTAs are pro-trade, but only at 
                                                 
4 Again, the coefficient estimated for the baseline (‘Time post-RTA’) gives back the trade effect of SPSs on cereals 
after the approval of RTAs. 
 aggregate level: in fact, divergences emerge at product level, with trade of the vast majority of the 
agri-food sectors limited by the SPSs after the entry into force of RTAs. 
4. Discussion, concluding and policy implications 
Trade agreements and trade measures are policy instruments thought to liberalise and favour 
trade by providing a degree of harmonisation among members [6]. 
Our analyses provided differences before and after the introduction of the agreements, and 
among the most regulated agri-food products. In particular, our findings showed the evolution in 
opposite directions of trade and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPSs) over time: in line with 
Grant and Lambert [36], we demonstrated that trade agreements tend to favour the increase of trade 
and the reduction of policy measures between members. However, we found the existence of 
regulation inequalities across trade agreements covering different geo-economic areas. After the 
approval of trade agreements, the existence and the importance of SPSs become relevant among 
developing countries, whereas the pervasiveness of SPSs becomes less stringed between countries 
with different levels of economic development (developed-developing countries). Such trends shed 
light on two phenomena: first, the proliferation of trade measures may induce distortions in trade 
flows of developing countries, that respond to external pressures by implementing other trade 
measures [27, 26]; second, the lower stringency of trade measure between developed and developing 
countries within trade agreements highlight that a process of convergence is more likely to be 
achieved in a regional rather than on a multilateral framework [17]. 
Our analyses also proved the hypothesis that trade agreements and trade measures are 
instruments that policymakers adopt to facilitate trade. However, this hypothesis is true only at 
aggregate level. In fact, product-specific analyses showed that cereals is the only agri-food sector 
that benefits from the joint influence of trade agreements and SPSs. Accordingly, policy instruments 
have to be calibrated case-by-case to achieve their full potential [13]. 
The adoption of SPSs may benefit trade liberalisation, or imply trade reduction. In such a 
framework, trade agreements may be determinant in avoiding trade distortions in favour of 
members. Understanding how SPSs work in the agreements, and how they joint influence trade 
would help planning (and managing) trade policies. In fact, at regional level, there are programmes 
to facilitate the harmonisation of standards: an example is the Asia and Pacific Plant Protection 
Commission, which develop regional standards for SPSs as part of the plant protection programme 
of the Commission’s contracting parties. Programmes of harmonisation of standards make available 
regional standards for SPSs to contracting and other interested parties, in order to facilitate trade and 
to avoid the use of unjustifiable SPSs as barriers to trade [43]. 
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